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Alonso Sala
CRIMINAL LAWYERS

Criminal Lawyers in Abusive Agreements

Defense of the minority shareholder against the imposition of harmful agreements by the majority (Art. 291 CP)

The offence of imposing abusive resolutions under Art. 291 of the Spanish Criminal Code (CP) punishes the shareholder majority that, abusing its position, adopts a resolution with no benefit to the company and intent to harm the other shareholders —typically refusing to distribute dividends despite recurring profits, to force the minority shareholder to sell at a loss—, with imprisonment of 6 months to 3 years or a fine of one to three times the gain obtained. The criminal route is compatible with a commercial law challenge. Our defence establishes, for the majority shareholder, the corporate interest behind the decision, and for the minority shareholder, quantifies the harm through forensic accounting evidence.

The Majority "Steamroller"

The offence of imposition of abusive resolutions, regulated in Art. 291 of the Spanish Criminal Code, is the minority partner's criminal trench against the controlling partner's or group's steamroller. It protects the company's interest and the assets of non-dominant partners against decisions adopted in shareholders' meetings or boards that, lacking any benefit for the company, deliberately harm those not holding the majority. Settled Supreme Court case-law has precisified that the type requires three cumulative elements: prevailing majority position, adoption of an abusive resolution without corporate benefit, and profit motive (own or third-party) or intent to harm the other partners. As criminal lawyers specialising in corporate offences, we articulate the dual criminal-commercial route to rebalance the minority's negotiating position.

Typical Forms of Majority Abuse

The typical modalities we see in practice are recurring. The systematic policy of non-distribution of dividends: the majority accumulates reserves year after year despite recurring profits, suffocating the minority to force them to sell their stake at depressed prices, while administrators self-award disproportionate compensation. "Accordion" capital increases (reduction to zero and simultaneous increase) designed to dilute the troublesome partner who cannot attend. Related-party transactions with companies of the controlling environment under adverse market conditions for the company (overprices, unnecessary services, loans at non-market rates). Disproportionate compensation to the controlling administrator acting as covert profit distribution. And freeze-outs through systematic refusal of information, exclusion from meetings or defective notices breaching the right of attendance.

Penalties and Concurrent Actions

The penalties under Art. 291 CP comprise prison from 6 months to 3 years or fine equal to triple the benefit obtained, alternative graduated by the judge according to gravity. To this main sanction the special disqualification from acting as administrator or company representative for up to six years is added, as well as civil liability for the damages caused to the minority's assets and, where applicable, to the company itself. When abusive resolutions concur with other corporate offences (Art. 290 CP on false accounts, Art. 293 CP on denial of information rights, Art. 252 CP on unfair administration), penalties accumulate in real concurrence, multiplying the criminal reach. Conviction under Art. 291 CP usually coexists with the commercial challenge action against the resolutions (Arts. 204-208 LSC) and with the social and individual liability actions (Arts. 238-241 LSC).

Defence and Prosecution

The technical defence and prosecution strategy are articulated on several lines. When representing the harmed partner, we build the proof of prevailing position and profit motive through forensic accounting expertise quantifying the damage, cross-cutting analysis of compensation, undistributed dividends and related-party transactions; we collect emails, minutes and documents evidencing intent; and we articulate valuation expertise of the minority stake to support compensation. When defending the controlling partner, we articulate the existence of social interest: real need for capitalisation for investments or expansion, prudential financial policy recommended by external auditor, absence of distributable profit due to treasury demands, compensation approved by meeting and proportional to actual functions. We challenge profit motive or harm intent through expert evidence proving the economic rationality of the challenged resolution.

Current Forensic Practice

In current forensic practice we observe sustained growth in criminal proceedings for abusive resolutions, especially in closed family companies after inheritances, divorces or generational changes, and in tech investees with fragmented cap tables after several investment rounds. Act 5/2021 on long-term shareholder engagement, Crea y Crece Act 18/2022, Organic Law 1/2025 on Justice Service Efficiency and consolidated case-law on fiduciary disloyalty and director's duty of care (Arts. 225-232 LSC) have reinforced minority-protection mechanisms. At Alonso Sala, we approach each corporate conflict as a multidimensional operation: we map economic flows, audit majority decisions, assess in penalty terms the typifiable conducts and build a tiered strategy with clear negotiation milestones. The aim is not always the criminal conviction —rarely the client's priority—, but to rebalance the negotiating position to reach an orderly exit with fair stake valuation, recapitalisation, separation of partners or dissolution.

Why Alonso Sala for Abusive Agreements?

Specialized defense of minority partners against majority steamroller. Dual criminal-commercial strategy

  • Dual criminal-commercial litigation: agreement challenge + Art. 291 complaint.
  • Accounting experts: partner harm valuation vs. zero social benefit.
  • Circumstantial evidence profit motive: emails, related operations, disproportionate salaries.
  • Majority defense: social interest of agreement (investment, necessary expansion).

Corporate Crimes in Spain: Director Liability and Shareholder Protection (Arts. 290-297 CP)

Corporate crimes (delitos societarios) are a specific category of economic offenses that protect the proper functioning of commercial companies and the rights of their shareholders. Regulated in Articles 290 to 297 of the Spanish Criminal Code, they encompass offenses ranging from false accounting to abuse of majority power and obstruction of regulatory inspections. These are crimes that can only be committed by company directors or partners in their corporate capacity.

Penalty Overview: Corporate Offenses

OffenseArticlePenalty
False AccountsArt. 290 CP1 – 3 years + fine
Abusive AgreementsArt. 291 CP6 months – 3 years
Harmful AgreementsArt. 292 CP6 months – 3 years
Denial of RightsArt. 293 CP6 months – 3 years
Obstruction of InspectionArt. 294 CPFine 12-24 months + disqualification
Unfair AdministrationArt. 252 CP1 – 6 years

Key Defence Strategies

Business Judgment Rule

Demonstrate that the director's decision was made within reasonable business parameters, with adequate information, and in good faith — even if the outcome was unfavorable.

Absence of Economic Harm

Corporate crimes under Arts. 290-295 require actual financial damage to the company or its shareholders. If harm was speculative or non-existent, the offense is not complete.

Shareholder Consent / Ratification

If the general meeting ratified the director's actions or all shareholders consented, certain corporate offenses may lack the required element of acting against corporate interest.

Statute of Limitations

Corporate crimes carry relatively short prescription periods (5 years). Complex corporate investigations often exceed these timeframes, providing a strong procedural defence.

FAQs

Is any agreement that harms me a crime?
No. For it to be a crime, the agreement must be 'abusive', not benefit the company, and be imposed by the majority with the aim of personal gain or to harm the minority. A simple disagreement is a business dispute, not a crime.
If I don't distribute dividends, is it a crime?
It can be. If the company has recurring profits and the majority systematically refuses to distribute dividends without a justified reason (e.g., a necessary large investment), it can be an abusive agreement to force the minority shareholder to sell their stake cheaply.
What is an 'accordion' capital increase?
It's an operation to 'clean up' the balance sheet and, often, to oust minority partners. It consists of reducing capital to zero to absorb losses and simultaneously increasing it. If done so the minority cannot participate, they are diluted. It can be a crime.
How is 'profit motive' proven?
It's the hardest element. It's proven by circumstantial evidence: if the agreement directly benefits companies of the majority, if they raise their salaries while denying dividends, or if there are communications revealing the intent to harm the minority.
Isn't this a matter for the commercial court?
Yes, corporate agreements are challenged in the commercial jurisdiction. But if the agreement is 'manifestly' abusive and intentional, it can also be a crime. Often, both paths (criminal and commercial) are pursued in parallel.
If I am the majority shareholder, how do I defend myself?
By demonstrating that the agreement, although it may punctually harm the minority, was adopted in the interest of the company. For example, not distributing dividends to finance a necessary expansion or a strategic investment that will benefit everyone in the long run.
Can abusive resolutions of the shareholders' meeting be challenged?
Yes. Corporate resolutions that are contrary to the law or the bylaws, or harmful to the company's interest, can be challenged in court. If they are also criminal, the criminal route under Art. 291 CP is available.
Is it a crime to exploit a majority position to impose a harmful resolution?
Yes, if an abusive resolution is imposed to the detriment of the other shareholders by taking advantage of a majority position. Art. 291 CP punishes this conduct with 6 months to 3 years of imprisonment.
Are directors who implement abusive resolutions also liable?
Yes. Directors who knowingly implement resolutions they know to be abusive can be held liable as necessary cooperators in the corporate offence.
Can an abusive resolution be reported without being a shareholder?
Company creditors cannot file a complaint directly under Art. 291 CP, but they can bring actions if the resolution harms them, and they can report unfair administration where applicable.

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