
Criminal Lawyers in Abusive Agreements
Defence of the minority shareholder against the imposition of harmful agreements by the majority (Art. 291 CP)
The offence of imposing abusive resolutions under Art. 291 of the Spanish Criminal Code (CP) punishes the shareholder majority that, abusing its position, imposes an abusive resolution with no benefit to the company, with a view to profit for itself or others and to the detriment of the other shareholders —typically refusing to distribute dividends despite recurring profits, to force the minority shareholder to sell at a loss—, with imprisonment of 6 months to 3 years or a fine of one to three times the gain obtained. The criminal route is compatible with a commercial law challenge. Our defence establishes, for the majority shareholder, the corporate interest behind the decision, and for the minority shareholder, quantifies the harm through forensic accounting evidence.
The Majority "Steamroller"
The offence of imposition of abusive resolutions, regulated in Art. 291 of the Spanish Criminal Code, is the minority partner's criminal trench against the controlling partner's or group's steamroller. It protects the company's interest and the assets of non-dominant partners against decisions adopted in shareholders' meetings or boards that, lacking any benefit for the company, deliberately harm those not holding the majority. Art. 291 requires all of these elements: taking advantage of a majority position, imposition of an abusive resolution without corporate benefit, a profit motive (own or third-party) and harm to the other partners. As criminal lawyers specialising in corporate offences, we articulate the dual criminal-commercial route to rebalance the minority's negotiating position.
Typical Forms of Majority Abuse
The typical modalities we see in practice are recurring. The systematic policy of non-distribution of dividends: the majority accumulates reserves year after year despite recurring profits, suffocating the minority to force them to sell their stake at depressed prices, while administrators self-award disproportionate compensation. "Accordion" capital increases (reduction to zero and simultaneous increase) designed to dilute the troublesome partner who cannot attend. Related-party transactions with companies of the controlling environment under adverse market conditions for the company (overprices, unnecessary services, loans at non-market rates). Disproportionate compensation to the controlling administrator acting as covert profit distribution. And freeze-outs through systematic refusal of information, exclusion from meetings or defective notices breaching the right of attendance, conduct that fits Art. 293 CP rather than Art. 291.
Penalties and Concurrent Actions
The penalties under Art. 291 CP comprise prison from 6 months to 3 years or fine of one to three times the benefit obtained, alternative graduated by the judge according to gravity. Art. 291 carries no special disqualification of its own: it can only be imposed as an accessory penalty, for the duration of the sentence, where the office was directly connected with the offence (Art. 56.1.3 CP). Added to the penalty is civil liability for the damages caused to the minority's assets and, where applicable, to the company itself. When abusive resolutions concur with other corporate offences (Art. 290 CP on false accounts, Art. 293 CP on denial of information rights, Art. 252 CP on unfair administration), penalties may accumulate in real concurrence if they are separate acts (Arts. 73 and 76 CP). Conviction under Art. 291 CP usually coexists with the commercial challenge action against the resolutions (Arts. 204-208 LSC) and with the social and individual liability actions (Arts. 238-241 LSC).
Defence and Prosecution
The technical defence and prosecution strategy are articulated on several lines. When representing the harmed partner, we build the proof of prevailing position and profit motive through forensic accounting expertise quantifying the damage, cross-cutting analysis of compensation, undistributed dividends and related-party transactions; we collect emails, minutes and documents evidencing intent; and we articulate valuation expertise of the minority stake to support compensation. When defending the controlling partner, we articulate the existence of social interest: real need for capitalisation for investments or expansion, prudential financial policy recommended by external auditor, absence of distributable profit due to treasury demands, compensation approved by meeting and proportional to actual functions. We challenge profit motive or harm intent through expert evidence proving the economic rationality of the challenged resolution.
Current Forensic Practice
In current forensic practice we observe sustained growth in criminal proceedings for abusive resolutions, especially in closed family companies after inheritances, divorces or generational changes, and in tech investees with fragmented cap tables after several investment rounds. Act 5/2021 on long-term shareholder engagement and consolidated case-law on fiduciary disloyalty and director's duty of care (Arts. 225-232 LSC) have reinforced minority-protection mechanisms. At Alonso Sala, we approach each corporate conflict as a multidimensional operation: we map economic flows, audit majority decisions, assess in penalty terms the typifiable conducts and build a tiered strategy with clear negotiation milestones. The aim is not always the criminal conviction —rarely the client's priority—, but to rebalance the negotiating position to reach an orderly exit with fair stake valuation, recapitalisation, separation of partners or dissolution.
Why Alonso Sala for Abusive Agreements?
Specialized defence of minority partners against majority steamroller. Dual criminal-commercial strategy
- Dual criminal-commercial litigation: agreement challenge + Art. 291 complaint.
- Accounting experts: partner harm valuation vs. zero social benefit.
- Circumstantial evidence profit motive: emails, related operations, disproportionate salaries.
- Majority defence: social interest of agreement (investment, necessary expansion).
Corporate Crimes in Spain: Director Liability and Shareholder Protection (Arts. 290-297 CP)
Corporate crimes (delitos societarios) are a specific category of economic offences that protect the proper functioning of commercial companies and the rights of their shareholders. Regulated in Articles 290 to 297 of the Spanish Criminal Code, they encompass offences ranging from false accounting to abuse of majority power and obstruction of regulatory inspections. They are generally committed by company directors (de facto or de jure) or by partners in their corporate capacity, although Art. 292 also reaches whoever takes advantage of the harmful resolution.
Penalty Overview: Corporate Offences
| Offence | Article | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| False Accounts | Art. 290 CP | 1 – 3 years + fine |
| Abusive Agreements | Art. 291 CP | 6 months – 3 years or a fine of one to three times the benefit |
| Harmful Agreements | Art. 292 CP | 6 months – 3 years or a fine of one to three times the benefit |
| Denial of Rights | Art. 293 CP | Fine of 6 to 12 months |
| Obstruction of Inspection | Art. 294 CP | Prison 6 months-3 years or fine 12-24 months |
| Unfair Administration | Art. 252 CP | 6 months – 3 years (1 – 6 or 4 – 8 years if aggravated, Art. 250) |
Key Defence Strategies
Business Judgment Rule
Demonstrate that the director's decision was made within reasonable business parameters, with adequate information, and in good faith — even if the outcome was unfavorable.
Absence of Harm or of Capacity to Harm
Art. 290 requires the falsehood to be capable of causing economic harm (if the harm occurs, the penalty rises to its upper half) and Arts. 291 and 292 require the resolution to be imposed to the detriment of the shareholders or the company. If the falsehood could not cause harm or the resolution harmed no one, the offence is not made out; Arts. 293 and 294, by contrast, require no economic harm.
Shareholder Consent / Ratification
If the general meeting ratified the director's actions or all shareholders consented, certain corporate offences may lack the required element of acting against corporate interest.
Statute of Limitations
Corporate crimes (Arts. 290-294) become time-barred 5 years after they are committed (Arts. 131.1 and 132.1 CP). The period is interrupted once proceedings are directed against the suspect (Art. 132.2), so the defence turns on the time elapsed up to that point, not on the length of the investigation.
FAQs
Is any agreement that harms me a crime?
If I don't distribute dividends, is it a crime?
What is an 'accordion' capital increase?
How is 'profit motive' proven?
Isn't this a matter for the commercial court?
If I am the majority shareholder, how do I defend myself?
Can abusive resolutions of the shareholders' meeting be challenged?
Is it a crime to exploit a majority position to impose a harmful resolution?
Are directors who implement abusive resolutions also liable?
Can an abusive resolution be reported without being a shareholder?
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