Criminal Defense Lawyers in Obstruction of Justice

False Testimony: The Duty of Truth

The judicial system is based on truth. Lying to a Judge is a crime (Perjury/False Testimony). The Criminal Code punishes the witness who substantially deviates from the truth. However, the accused has the constitutional right not to confess; the witness has the legal obligation to tell the truth.

We defend people accused of lying in court by proving they did so out of fear, memory error, or to avoid self-incrimination.

Cover-up (Encubrimiento)

Helping a criminal to hide, destroy evidence, or flee is a crime. But there is a key exception: Family Ties. The law does not punish you if you hide your spouse, parent, child, or sibling (Excusa Absolutoria). We use this powerful defense to archive cases against relatives.

False Reporting and Crime Simulation

The third front concerns those who set the justice system in motion with an untrue account. False accusation (Art. 456 CP) punishes whoever falsely imputes a criminal offence to a specific person before an authority with a duty to investigate, knowing it to be false. Crime simulation (Art. 457 CP) punishes whoever feigns being the victim of a non-existent offence —a common scenario in fraudulent insurance claims— without identifying anyone. The defence centres on the absence of falsifying intent: a complaint that is later dismissed is not, for that reason alone, a false report; the prosecution must prove the accuser knew, from the outset, that the facts were untrue.

Stages of the criminal process and the competent court for offences against the Administration of Justice

Obstruction of justice and professional disloyalty are dealt with through ordinary criminal proceedings, usually the abbreviated track given the applicable penalties. Investigation always falls to the Investigating Court (Juzgado de Instrucción) of the district where the act took place: if the conduct consisted of intimidating a witness at a courthouse, territorial competence lies there. The investigating judge gathers the material (statements, documents, expert reports) and, once the investigation closes, issues an order transforming the case into abbreviated proceedings or, where appropriate, dismissing it.

The trial court is determined by the maximum penalty set in the abstract for the offence, under Article 14 LECrim. The offences in Articles 463 to 467, whose ceiling does not exceed four years in prison, are tried before the Criminal Court (Juzgado de lo Penal). Only if a concurrence of offences or an aggravated form pushed the penalty above five years would the Provincial Court (Audiencia Provincial) come into play. This bears emphasis because it causes confusion: these offences are not assigned to the National Court (Audiencia Nacional), which has no objective competence over them.

This delimitation is no harmless technicality. A case investigated or sentenced by an incompetent court is void, and objective competence may be assessed on the court's own motion and even at the cassation stage. That is why analysing the precise classification (which article is charged and with what penalty) determines from the outset before whom the matter is litigated, which appeals are available, and the regime of the second instance. A careful defence raises these questions of competence and procedure in the initial pleadings, not at the end of the trial.

The subjective element: intent, the aim to influence, and the line with non-criminal conduct

The offences in Articles 463 to 467 require intent (dolo): the person must know and want the conduct described. A negligent failure to appear or omission is not enough. Under Article 463, the non-appearance that causes the oral trial to be suspended must be both unjustified and voluntary; someone who fails to attend due to proven force majeure, illness or a defective summons does not commit the offence. The burden of showing the absence of justification falls on the prosecution, and any reasonable doubt about the legitimacy of the excuse must be resolved in the defendant's favour.

Under Article 464, the violence or intimidation must be directed to a specific aim: to influence a complainant, party or accused in a procedure, or their lawyer, court agent, expert, interpreter or witness, so that they act or refrain from acting in that process. It is an offence defined by an internal purpose; if the violence is exercised for reasons unconnected to the case (a personal dispute with no link to the procedure), the act may be a different offence, but not this one. The second paragraph additionally punishes later retaliation for what has already been done, extending the reproach to a completed reprisal.

Proof of intent and of that aim is rarely direct. It is built on indicators: the timing of the conduct relative to the proceedings, the content of the words used, the relationship between the person applying pressure and the result sought in the case. The defence works precisely on the soundness of that inference, showing reasonable alternative explanations, the absence of any link to the procedure, or the unsuitability of the pressure to condition the procedural conduct in question.

Distinction from neighbouring offences: threats, coercion, perjury and false accusation

Article 464 overlaps in its factual basis with ordinary threats and coercion, but it is distinguished by its procedural context and aim: the pressure must be directed at someone who takes part in a specific procedure in order to condition their participation in it. Where that orientation is present, Article 464 as a rule displaces the general offences because it is more specific. Identifying the correct classification is decisive, since the penalty, the competent court and the limitation period all depend on it.

Obstruction of justice should not be confused with perjury or with false accusation or denunciation. A person who lies as a witness commits a separate offence; a person who attributes criminal acts to another knowing them to be false, or with reckless disregard for the truth, answers for false accusation or denunciation. Obstruction under Article 464, by contrast, does not punish the untruthful content of a statement but the violent or intimidating pressure exerted on the person who testifies or takes part, or the reprisal for having done so.

The professional disloyalty of Articles 465 to 467 occupies its own ground. Article 465 sanctions the lawyer or court agent who destroys, renders useless or conceals documents or proceedings disclosed to them in that capacity; Article 466 punishes the disclosure of proceedings declared secret. These are special offences, tied to the offender's professional position, and are not the same as ordinary breach of confidentiality or a mere disciplinary infraction. Fitting the facts to the exact article is the first step of a rigorous defence.

Limitation, statutory excuses, reparation and plea agreement

Limitation is calculated by the maximum penalty attached to the offence under Article 131 CP, which contains no three-year band. The conduct in Articles 463 to 467, with prison ceilings not exceeding four years, becomes time-barred after five years; only if an aggravation or concurrence raised the penalty above five and up to ten years would the period be ten. Time runs from the moment the offence was completed and is interrupted when the proceedings are effectively directed against the person responsible, not by mere undetermined steps.

The law provides excuses the defence must weigh. Where the conduct amounts to harbouring, the relatives' personal excuse of Article 454 operates, exempting from penalty the person who harbours a close relative, save for the case covered by Article 451.1. In the field of perjury, the retraction of Article 462 also operates: a person who retracts in time, before judgment is given in the case concerned and stating the truth, may be exempt or have their liability reduced. These are technical mechanisms whose application requires strict conditions of timing and form.

Where the facts are established, reparation of the harm and a plea agreement (conformidad) offer routes to mitigation. Acknowledging responsibility, making amends to the victim of the obstructive act, or restoring the affected procedural situation can operate as mitigating factors and favour an agreement on a reduced penalty, avoiding the oral trial. The choice between arguing that the conduct is not criminal, disputing intent, or negotiating a reparatory agreement depends on the available evidence and must be made case by case, with a calm analysis of the material and of the real procedural risk.