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Alonso Sala
CRIMINAL LAWYERS
ES

Artificial Intelligence and Digital Evidence in Criminal Process

Criminal defense against digital evidence generated or manipulated by AI: deepfakes, synthetic voice, algorithmic expert evidence and predictive model bias.

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Spanish criminal law faces a paradigmatic change: artificial intelligence has entered forensic evidence, both on the prosecution's side (predictive models, facial recognition, algorithmic analysis of evidence) and on the criminals' side (deepfakes, synthetic voice, AI forgeries). Modern criminal defense requires contradictory technical capacity over each piece of evidence of algorithmic origin: it is no longer enough to argue the law; one must be able to discuss the model, the data and the method. This page is the gateway to the area; each vector also has its own detailed analysis.

The New Evidentiary Standard in the AI Era

The EU AI Regulation (2024/1689) has established risk categories and transparency obligations affecting the forensic use of models. When an investigation or accusation relies on AI, the defense can demand four guarantees: (1) traceability of the model used —which algorithm, which version, which training data—; (2) a bias audit and the error rate applicable to the specific profile; (3) reproducibility of the result by an independent expert with documented methodology; and (4) significant human supervision, not merely formal. The absence of any of these elements compromises the admissibility of the evidence and opens the way to its exclusion under the clause of Article 11.1 LOPJ. Unlike traditional evidence, algorithmic evidence is not validated by the appearance of reliability, but by its capacity to be subjected to effective contradiction.

Deepfakes: Detection and Challenge

The first major front is synthetic audiovisual content. A deepfake submitted as prosecution evidence may have been fabricated or altered through generative adversarial networks (GAN) or diffusion models, and its challenge requires specific forensic expert evidence: frequency analysis, search for generation artifacts, biometric inconsistencies and verification of metadata and of the watermarks that Regulation 2024/1689 imposes on synthetic content. On the opposite side, when the deepfake is the instrument of the offense (sextortion, slander, impersonation), we represent the victim by exercising the private prosecution. We develop this vector on the page on challenging deepfakes as criminal evidence.

Voice Impersonation and Vishing

AI voice cloning has made accessible attacks that previously required sophisticated means: with a sample of a few seconds, a synthetic voice is generated capable of sustaining a credible call. The result is CEO fraud, family impersonation in fake emergencies and telephone banking fraud. The defense —both of the accused and of the affected company or individual— relies on contradictory acoustic expert evidence and on the analysis of the attack vector and the bank's diligence. We address it at length in AI vishing and voice impersonation.

Audit of Algorithmic Models

When the prosecution relies on a model —facial recognition, automated analysis of image, audio or text— the evidence is only admissible if it is traceable, reproducible and supervised. The defense can demand the full documentation of the model and commission an independent algorithmic expert report that reproduces the result, audits the dataset and contrasts the error metrics. The provider's trade secret is not an absolute shield against the right of defense when the evidence is decisive. This line is developed in algorithmic expert evidence.

Bias in Predictive Investigation

Finally, when the very decision to investigate stems from a predictive model —territorial predictive policing, hotspots or individual recidivism profiling— the defense can question the very origin of the suspicion. Models trained on historical complaint data inherit and amplify prior biases, which affects the reasonable indication, the proportionality of the measures and the presumption of innocence. We analyze the procedural and constitutional exclusion strategies in bias in predictive models.

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Penalty Chart

Type / ScenarioCriminal Penalty
Evidence nullity (Art. 11.1 LOPJ)If the AI evidence violates fundamental rights or is not reproducible: nullity and exclusion.
Atypicality due to reasonable doubtWhen evidentiary weight rests mainly on contradicted AI: acquittal due to presumption of innocence.
Mitigation for induced errorIf the accused was a victim of AI manipulation (deepfake used against them): mitigating factor 21.6 CP or exemption.

* Penalties shown are indicative. The actual penalty depends on case circumstances, applicable mitigating and aggravating factors.

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Our Defense Strategy

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Double Expert Report

Technical and legal-deontological expert reports evaluating both technical solidity and procedural guarantees.

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Forensic Pre-Constituted Evidence

Securing original evidence before any algorithmic processing to preserve counter-evidence.

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Dataset Challenge

When the AI used has documented biases, challenge the result showing the bias weight in the specific case.

Cybercrime in Spain: Hacking, Phishing & Digital Fraud — Defence Guide

Cybercrime encompasses illegal access to computer systems (Art. 197 bis CP), computer damage and ransomware (Art. 264 CP), phishing and digital fraud (Art. 249.1.a CP), and the production or distribution of hacking tools (Art. 197 ter). Spain's prosecution of cybercrime has intensified dramatically, with specialised units in the National Police (BIT) and Guardia Civil (GDT) leading investigations. Defence requires a unique combination of criminal law expertise and advanced technical knowledge.

Penalty Table: Cybercrime

OffenceArticleDescriptionPenalty
Illegal access to systemsArt. 197 bisUnauthorised access breaching security measures6 months – 2 years
Interception of dataArt. 197 bis.2Intercepting non-public data transmissions3 months – 2 years
Production/supply of hacking toolsArt. 197 terCreating or distributing tools designed for cybercrime6 months – 2 years
Computer damage (basic)Art. 264.1Deleting, damaging or making data inaccessible6 months – 3 years
Aggravated damage (critical infrastructure)Art. 264.2Affecting essential services or critical infrastructure2 – 5 years prison
Cyber fraud (phishing)Art. 249.1.aIT manipulation to obtain unlawful transfer of assets6 months – 3 years

Key Defence Strategies

IP Attribution Challenge

An IP address does not identify a person. Shared Wi-Fi networks, VPNs, Tor exit nodes and NAT configurations mean multiple users may share one IP. The prosecution must prove the accused was the actual user at the relevant time.

Chain of Digital Custody

Digital evidence is extremely fragile. If the police failed to image the hard drive with a write-blocker, if hash values don't match, or if evidence was handled improperly, the defence can seek exclusion of the entire digital evidence chain.

Authorised Security Testing

Ethical hacking and penetration testing carried out with the system owner's authorisation is legal. If the defendant had a written engagement contract, bug bounty agreement or responsible disclosure policy, there is no criminal offence.

Lack of 'Breaching Security Measures'

Art. 197 bis requires that security measures were breached. If the system had no password, no firewall, or the access point was public, the element of 'breaching security' may be absent, negating the offence.

Key Case Law

Doctrina TSElements of illegal access (Art. 197 bis)

The Supreme Court confirmed that 'access' requires effectively entering the system, not merely attempting it. The prosecution must prove: (1) access occurred, (2) it was unauthorised, and (3) security measures were breached. Port scanning alone does not constitute the offence.

Doctrina TSRansomware as combined offence

The Court ruled that ransomware attacks may constitute a concurrent offence of computer damage (Art. 264) and extortion (Art. 243 CP). The encryption of data satisfies the 'damage' element even if data is technically recoverable upon payment.

Doctrina TSPhishing and the 'money mule' defence

In phishing operations, the Court distinguished between the organiser and the 'money mule' (account holder). The mule's liability depends on proof of knowledge that the funds were illicit. Wilful blindness may suffice, but mere negligence does not.

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Why Choose Us?

Need a criminal defense lawyer for this type of offense? Here's how we work:

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Specialized Forensic ExpertEngage experts with specific training in forensic AI to technically contradict algorithmic evidence.
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Demand Model TraceabilityProcedural demand for model documentation: dataset, training, metrics and biases.
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Challenge for Lack of Human SupervisionActivate nullity when algorithmic evidence determined imputation without significant human review.
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+15 Years of ExperienceTeam dedicated exclusively to criminal law before Spanish courts and tribunals.
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Direct AttentionYour case is handled directly by a senior lawyer of the firm.
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The judicial system is complex. We have the criminal-law specialisation and technical resources required to take on the defence.

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